Florida Law Review
Volume 63 | Issue 6

Article 6

2-8-2013

Losing Our Soul: Judicial Discretion in Sentencing
Child Pornography Offenders
Kathryn A. Kimball

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Recommended Citation
Kathryn A. Kimball, Losing Our Soul: Judicial Discretion in Sentencing Child Pornography Offenders, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 1515 (2011).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss6/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by an
authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact outler@law.ufl.edu.

Kimball: Losing Our Soul: Judicial Discretion in Sentencing Child Pornogra

LOSING OUR SOUL: JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN SENTENCING
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENDERS
Kathryn A. Kimball∗
Abstract
Child pornography offenders capitalize on the vulnerability of children
and find pleasure in their victims’ humiliation. In United States v. Irey, the
defendant sadistically raped, sodomized, and tortured more than fifty
prepubescent girls and then broadcast this abuse across the Internet; yet the
court characterized Irey as a “victim” and granted him a downward
departure, sentencing him to 12.5 years below the minimum of the range
set by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
This Note argues that when courts depart from the sentences
recommended by the Guidelines for child pornography offenses by
improperly weighing the § 3553(a) factors, courts create grossly unjust
sentencing disparities for similarly situated defendants, fail to sufficiently
prevent recidivism, and underestimate the importance of retribution and
deterrence for child pornography offenses. Part I follows the history of the
Guidelines before and after the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker. Part II
provides an example of a district court improperly balancing the § 3553(a)
factors and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
demonstrating the appropriate method of appellate review. Part III
discusses the purposes of punishment in the child pornography context,
explores the empirical psychological research (including the controversial
Butner Study) that validates the severity of the Guidelines, and
demonstrates courts’ misplaced reliance on pedophilia as a mitigating
factor in sentencing. Finally, Part IV critiques common remedies for these
sentencing problems caused by inadvertent judicial activism and offers
three novel solutions for child pornography sentencing.

* J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.A. in Economics,
2009, Covenant College. Foremost, I would like to thank my mom, dad, and sister for their faithful
support, patience, and love through every phase of life. I am also deeply grateful to Professor
Michael Seigel and Professor Dennis Calfee for their invaluable insights and encouragement during
my law school tenure. Special thanks go to the members and editorial staff of the Florida Law
Review for their relentless hard work. It has been an honor and pleasure to serve as an editor
alongside such talented people. Finally, I also dedicate this Note to my Covenant College professors
and close friends who gave me grace when I needed it most and who continue to inspire me to make
Christ preeminent in all things. “But let justice roll down like waters, and righteousness like an
ever-flowing stream.” Amos 5:24.
1515

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 6 [2011], Art. 6

1516

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 1516
I.

FEDERAL SENTENCING HISTORY ............................................. 1519
A. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ..................................... 1520
B. The Booker Era ............................................................. 1522
C. Booker’s Aftermath: Current Sentencing Disparities,
Guidelines, and Policy Statements ................................ 1525

II.

GUIDELINE GUESSING ............................................................. 1526
A. Eleventh Circuit Archetype: United States v. Irey......... 1526
B. Sentencing Confusion Across the Federal System ......... 1533

III.

PURPOSES OF PUNISHMENT ..................................................... 1535
A. Retribution ..................................................................... 1536
B. Deterrence ..................................................................... 1537
C. Incapacitation ................................................................ 1538
1. Recidivism Rates and Undetected Contact
Offenses ......................................................................... 1538
2. Pedophilia and Predictive Risk Factors ................... 1540

IV.

REACHING REFORM ................................................................ 1542
A. Incomplete Responses .................................................... 1543
B. A Legislative Solution .................................................... 1545
C. Judicial Solutions .......................................................... 1546

CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 1548
“‘There can be no keener revelation of a society’s soul than the way in
which it treats its children.’ Given the current statistics surrounding child
pornography, we are living in a country that is losing its soul.”1
INTRODUCTION
Child pornography offenders fuel a booming $20 billion Internet
industry by turning the abuse of countless child victims into a lucrative
commodity.2 The repeated viewing of their exploitation causes victims to
feel violated long after their initial abuse and to fear being recognized by

1. United States v. Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d 844, 847 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (footnote
omitted) (quoting a statement commonly attributed to Nelson Mandela).
2. Michael L. Bourke & Andres E. Hernandez, The ‘Butner Study’ Redux: A Report of the
Incidence of Hands-On Child Victimization by Child Pornography Offenders, 24 J. FAM. VIOLENCE
183, 183–84 (2009) (citing congressional testimony by Ernie Allen, President and CEO of the
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss6/6

2

Kimball: Losing Our Soul: Judicial Discretion in Sentencing Child Pornogra

2011]

LOSING OUR SOUL

1517

those who find pleasure in their humiliation.3 In addition, courts
dehumanize child victims by keeping them nameless during prosecutions
against their predators4—those who produce, distribute, and possess the
degrading and vile images.5
In United States v. Irey,6 the defendant sadistically raped, sodomized,
and tortured more than fifty prepubescent girls and then broadcast this
abuse across the Internet; yet the court characterized Irey as a “victim” and
granted him a downward departure, sentencing him to 12.5 years below the
minimum of the range set by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.7 When
courts fail to recognize the gravity of these offenses by instead focusing
upon defendants’ characteristics, courts sterilize the despicable nature of
these crimes, misapply the letter and spirit of the law, and ignore the true
victims—the children.8
As early as 1977, Congress and the Department of Justice realized the
long-lasting detrimental effects on children caused by the production,
distribution, and possession of child pornography.9 In the 1980s, the
Supreme Court upheld state statutes banning the possession and
distribution of child pornography to control the child abuse necessarily
caused by child pornography production.10 In 2003, Congress passed the
3. United States v. Diaz, 720 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1040–41 (E.D. Wis. 2010); see, e.g., New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982) (stating that “the materials produced are a permanent
record of the children’s participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation”);
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 501(2)(D), 120 Stat.
587, 624 (2006) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2251) (“Every instance of viewing images of
child pornography represents a renewed violation of the privacy of the victims and a repetition of
their abuse.”).
4. Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 847.
5. See, e.g., id. at 847 (“Child pornography is a vile, heinous crime.”); United States v.
Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191, 1220 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Child sex crimes are among the most egregious and
despicable of societal and criminal offenses . . . .”).
6. 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
7. See infra notes 105–13, 123–28, 146, and accompanying text.
8. See Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 847 (“The sterilization goes far beyond properly
removing emotion from sentencing decisions. Images are described in the most clinical sense.
Victims all too often remain nameless. The only emotions on display are those of defendants, sorry
that their actions were discovered by law enforcement.”). But see, e.g., Irey, 612 F.3d at 1178,
1199–1203, 1205–06 (describing how the district court improperly relied upon the defendant’s
illness of “pedophilia” and his age upon release).
9. Giannina Marin, Note, Possession of Child Pornography: Should You Be Convicted when
the Computer Cache Does the Saving for You?, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1205, 1208 (2008) (showing
Congress’ concern as early as the passage of the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation
Act of 1977).
10. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761, 778 (1982) (allowing New York’s ban on
distribution of nonobscene images due to the long-term impact on children); Osborne v. Ohio, 495
U.S. 103, 109, 111 (1990) (validating Ohio’s statute that proscribed both possession and viewing of
child pornography because of the state’s strong interest in protecting young victims); see also
Marin, supra note 9, at 1208–09.
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Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of
Children Today (PROTECT) Act, due to concerns that the growing number
of downward departures and unwarranted sentencing disparities for sex
offenses against children failed to deter crime.11 Child pornography statutes
are currently codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–2260.12 Specifically, §§ 2252
and 2252A ban the possession and distribution of child pornography,13
while § 2260 prohibits the use of minors to “engage in any sexually
explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such
conduct.”14 In response to the congressional concern that child sex offenses
were not being sufficiently punished, the U.S. Attorney’s Office has
continuously increased the number of these prosecutions—from 423 cases
in 1994 and 1995 combined, to 1,566 cases in 2008 alone.15 Prosecutors
have particularly focused on child pornography offenses,16 and the average
sentence for such offenders has subsequently increased from 36 months in
1995 to 120 months in 2008.17 Due to these targeted efforts, child
pornography offenses currently constitute the largest portion of all sexual
exploitation cases prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office.18
Before the PROTECT Act, courts regularly disregarded congressional
and prosecutorial priorities and instead granted downward departures for
sexual exploitation offenses against children.19 Even though Congress has
clearly attempted to restrain judicial activism in this arena by specifying a
list of factors that should influence sentencing decisions in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), courts continually grant significant departures from the
Guidelines,20 especially since the Supreme Court made the Guidelines
merely “advisory” in United States v. Booker.21
This Note argues that when courts depart from the sentences
recommended by the Guidelines for child pornography offenses by
11. U. S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON
FEDERAL SENTENCING 52, 115 (2006) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT], available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Sub
missions/200603_Booker/Booker_Report.pdf.
12. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–2260 (2006); see also Marin, supra note 9, at 1209.
13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2252A (2006).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 2260 (2006) (defining what is commonly referred to as the production of
child pornography).
15. United States v. Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d 844, 847 (N.D. Ohio 2010).
16. Kristin Carlson, Commentary, Strong Medicine: Toward Effective Sentencing of Child
Pornography Offenders, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 27, 27 (2010),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/109/carlson.pdf (stating that child pornography cases
constituted 69% of all child exploitation cases in 2006).
17. Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 847.
18. Anita Lam, Jennifer Mitchell & Michael C. Seto, Lay Perceptions of Child Pornography
Offenders, 52 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 174, 174 (2010).
19. FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 52.
20. Id. at 122.
21. 543 U.S. 220, 250 (2005).
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improperly weighing the § 3553(a) factors, courts create grossly unjust
sentencing disparities for similarly situated defendants, fail to sufficiently
prevent recidivism, and underestimate the importance of retribution and
deterrence for child pornography offenses.22 Part I follows the history of
the Guidelines before and after the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker.
Part II provides an example of a district court improperly balancing the
§ 3553(a) factors and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
demonstrating the appropriate method of appellate review. Part II
concludes by surveying other federal district courts that overinflate the
importance of defendants’ backgrounds and characteristics at the expense
of the other § 3553(a) factors. Part III discusses the purposes of
punishment in the child pornography context, exploring the empirical
psychological research validating the severity of the Guidelines and
demonstrating the misplaced reliance upon pedophilia as a mitigating
factor. Finally, Part IV critiques common remedies for the aforementioned
sentencing problems caused by inadvertent judicial activism and offers
three novel solutions for child pornography sentencing.
I. FEDERAL SENTENCING HISTORY
The current federal sentencing structure23 empowers federal judges
with significant sentencing discretion, and appellate review on substantive
grounds remains extremely deferential.24 Despite congressional efforts to
limit disparities in sentencing due to judicial freedom,25 the Supreme Court
reinstated the historical rights of judges to select from a wide array of
sentencing options after successful constitutional challenges to the
mandatory Guidelines.26 This Part traces the historical transition from pure
judicial discretion in to mandated sentencing per the Guidelines back to
judicial freedom once the Court made the Guidelines merely advisory.

22. Contra Rosemary Barkett, Judicial Discretion and Judicious Deliberation, 59 FLA. L.
REV. 905, 907 (2007) (advocating that judicial discretion in sentencing “lead[s] to greater fairness
and equality”).
23. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(3) (2008).
24. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1180 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
25. FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 52 (explaining that the PROTECT Act’s most radical
impact was reinstating de novo appellate review of sentencing, thereby undoing the abuse-ofdiscretion standard established by Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996)); see also
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT)
Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21 § 401(m)(2)(a), 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18, 21, 28, 42, and 47 U.S.C.) (instructing the U.S. Sentencing Commission to
amend the Guidelines to prevent more downward departures).
26. Booker, 543 U.S. at 250–56.
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A. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
Before the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA),27 federal judges
possessed virtually unfettered sentencing discretion, provided that they
imposed sentences within the statutory boundaries.28 Appellate review was
limited to ensuring that sentences did not exceed statutory maximums or
fall below statutory minimums.29 This sentencing structure inevitably
created widespread disparities in sentencing for similarly situated
defendants,30 giving rise to congressional concern and criticism.31 A
district judge and strong advocate for reform32 described the scheme as “a
non-system in which every judge is a law unto himself or herself and the
sentence a defendant gets depends on the judge he or she gets.”33 Because
of these arbitrary sentencing disparities and public demand for more certain
and severe punishments, a determinate sentencing system ultimately
emerged.34
The SRA established a mandatory framework for federal sentencing
primarily to reduce the disparities and to increase fairness and uniformity
for criminals with similar backgrounds who commit similar crimes.35 The
27. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3559, 3561–3566, 3571–3574, 3581–3586, 3601–3607, 3611–3615, 3621–
3625, 3673, 3742 & 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2006)).
28. Adam Denver Griffin, Note, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ Abuse of Trust
Enhancement: An Argument for the Professional Discretion Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 457, 463–
64 (2011); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION
1–2
(2005)
[hereinafter
SENTENCING
COMM’N],
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/About_the_Commission/Overview_of_the_USSC/USSC_Overview.pdf.
29. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1180–81 (quoting Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431
(1974) (“[O]nce it is determined that a sentence is within the limitations set forth in the statute
under which it is imposed, appellate review is at an end.”); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443,
447 (1972) (“[A] sentence imposed by a federal district judge, if within statutory limits, is generally
not subject to review.”); see also Griffin, supra note 28.
30. Douglas A. Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 3–5 (2005);
Irey, 612 F.3d at 1181.
31. See, e.g., Irey, 612 F.3d at 1181 (citing S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 38–39 (1983), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3221–22 (criticizing the “unjustifiably wide range of sentences” that like
defendants received)); Griffin, supra note 28.
32. Griffin, supra note 28, at 463 & n.52; Irey, 612 F.3d at 1181 (describing Marvin Frankel
as a “leading champion[]” of the reform movement).
33. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1181 (quoting Marvin E. Frankel, Jail-Sentence Reform, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 1978, at E21) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Griffin, supra note 28, at 463–64
(quoting MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1972) (“[T]he almost
wholly unchecked and sweeping powers we give to judges in the fashioning of sentences are
terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes devotion to the rule of law.”)).
34. See Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa & Joanna M. Shepherd, Legislatures, Judges,
and Parole Boards: The Allocation of Discretion Under Determinate Sentencing, 62 FLA. L. REV.
1037, 1044–45 (2010) (interpreting the successful establishment of determinate sentencing reforms
as a result of the coalition between liberal and conservative interests).
35. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL
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SRA created the U.S. Sentencing Commission,36 designed to develop and
promulgate the Guidelines.37 Under the SRA, courts must first calculate a
“base offense level” to measure the seriousness of the crime and then
combine it with a “criminal history category” that assesses the defendant’s
prior criminal record.38 Together, these scores produce a presumptive
sentencing range, expressed in months, which is then subject to upward
and downward departures, depending on specific factual findings.39
The binding Guidelines severely limited the ranges of possible
sentences judges could impose40 and required courts to state reasons for the
particular sentences given.41 Departures from the ranges set by the
Guidelines were permissible only if “there exist[ed] an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
guidelines.”42 Courts could consult only the Guidelines themselves and the
official policy statements of the Commission when ruling on departures,43
and “[i]n most cases, as a matter of law, the Commission will have
adequately taken all relevant factors into account, and no departure will be
legally permissible.”44
The SRA encouraged district courts to “impose a sentence sufficient,
but not greater than necessary” to achieve the goals of punishment.45 It
mandated judges to consider the following § 3553(a) factors: (1) “the
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
of the defendant;” (2) the need for the sentence to bolster the purposes of
punishment; (3) the available kinds of sentences; (4) the Guidelines’ range;
(5) the Guidelines’ policy statements; (6) the need to prevent sentencing
disparities; and (7) the necessity of restitution to victims.46 Additionally,
SENTENCING 1 (2006) [hereinafter FACT SHEET], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/
United_States_v_Booker_Fact_Sheet.pdf; Griffin, supra note 28, at 464 (explaining Congress’s
three goals in federal sentencing: “(1) establishing honesty; (2) creating reasonable uniformity; and
(3) achieving proportionality”).
36. See generally Griffin, supra note 28, at 464 (stating that the Commission was composed
of nine members, seven voting and two nonvoting, and that the Commission’s first set of Guidelines
became effective November 1, 1987).
37. MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: PROSECUTION AND
ADJUDICATION: CASES, STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 372 (3d ed. 2007).
38. Id.; SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 28, at 2.
39. MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 37, at 372.
40. Id.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2006).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006).
43. Id.; United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1181 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
44. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 234 (2005); see also Griffin, supra note 28, at
464–65 (discussing the limitations placed on district courts following the imposition of the
mandatory Guidelines).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).
46. Id. § 3553(a)(1)–(7).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 6 [2011], Art. 6

1522

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

the SRA provided limited appellate review to vacate sentences that were
“unreasonable” in light of the considerations enumerated under § 3553(a)
and the district courts’ stated reasons for the departures.47
Conflict over the power of sentencing between the judicial and
legislative branches persisted. In 1996, the Supreme Court diminished the
role of appellate review in sentencing by lowering the standard to an abuse
of discretion,48 thereby reclaiming some district court judges’ discretion
and allowing for more departures from the Guidelines because of the “due
deference” given to district courts.49 In response to increased downward
departures for sex offenses against children, Congress passed the
PROTECT Act in 2003 to reestablish de novo appellate review.50 Under
the new statute, an appellate court could vacate a departure from a
Guideline range if the sentence was based on a factor that did not comport
with the § 3553(a) factors.51 The Guidelines significantly limited
departures in sexual exploitation cases by precluding any downward
departure other than those specifically detailed in the Guidelines.52 The
PROTECT Act demonstrated Congress’ desire that the Guidelines should
be mandatory53 and that courts should depart from the Guidelines only
because of extreme mitigating or aggravating circumstances that the
Commission failed to consider when formulating the ranges.54
B. The Booker Era
In United States v. Booker,55 the Supreme Court wrenched sentencing
power back to district court judges by declaring that the mandatory nature
47. Id. § 3742(a)–(b); Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996) (stating specifically that
§ 3742(a)–(b) allow a defendant to appeal an upward departure and the government to appeal a
downward departure); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005) (discussing the appellate
court’s role of determining whether a sentence is unreasonable “with regard to § 3553(a)”).
48. Koon, 518 U.S. at 97.
49. Id. (quoting Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 205 (1992)) (stating that the Act
“did not alter a court of appeals’ traditional deference to a district court’s exercise of its sentencing
discretion . . . [and] ‘it is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the
sentencing court.’” (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 n.16 (1983))).
50. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
(PROTECT) Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(d)(1)–(2), 117 Stat. 650, 670 (2003) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
51. Alan Vinegrad, The Feeney Amendment: Proposed Sentencing Reforms, 229 N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 8, 2003, available at http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/65656da5-23b0-4ced-aad994e218413e2f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/5c388c0e-9269-4bf2-a1e3-952c6c406f75/oid
6621.pdf.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2006); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0(b) (2010).
53. David P. Mason, Note, Barking Up the Wrong Tree: The Misplaced Furor Over the
Feeney Amendment as a Threat to Judicial Independence, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 731, 733
(2004).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2) (2006).
55. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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of the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment.56 The Court held the
SRA unconstitutional insofar as the Guidelines permitted a judge to
increase the sentence by relying upon facts not established by a jury
conviction or guilty plea.57 Ironically, the very act of exercising discretion
within a sentencing range requires a judge to make implicit findings of fact
at sentencing, yet the Court did not address this logical discrepancy.58 In an
effort to salvage the Guidelines, the Court excised two provisions,59
making the Guidelines merely advisory60 and establishing a
“reasonableness” standard of appellate review.61 Although the Court
recognized that it destroyed the uniformity in sentencing sought by
Congress in the SRA,62 it relied upon the reasonableness standard of
appellate review “to iron out sentencing differences.”63 Furthermore, the
Court emphasized the role of the § 3553(a) factors for both district courts’
sentencing decisions and the appellate courts’ reviews for reasonableness.64
In Rita v. United States,65 the Supreme Court emphatically stated that
courts of appeals should vacate federal sentences if unreasonable,66 a
standard that “merely asks whether the trial court abused its discretion.”67
The Court specifically held that courts of appeals could presume sentences
were reasonable if the sentences fell within the Guidelines’ prescribed
ranges.68

56. Id. at 250–56.
57. Id. at 244 (“Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a
sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury
verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
58. Michelle Reiss Drab, Comment, Constitutional Law: Fact or Factor: The Supreme Court
Eliminates Sentencing Factors and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 57 FLA. L. REV. 987, 996
(2005).
59. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259 (excising § 3553(b)(1), (e)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1)
(2006); 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2006).
60. Booker, 543 U.S. at 264 (“The district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines,
must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.”); see also Daniel Ryan
Koslosky, Comment, Constitutional Law: Predictability as Fairness and the Possible Return to
Federal Indeterminate Sentencing, 57 FLA. L. REV. 999, 1008 (2005) (explaining how the Court
maneuvered the Guidelines to make them merely advisory while not abolishing them with the intent
of increasing judicial sentencing discretion).
61. Booker, 543 U.S. at 260–61 (establishing “a practical standard of review already familiar
to appellate courts: review for ‘unreasonable[ness]’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3) (1994))).
62. Id. at 263.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 261 (“Those factors in turn will guide appellate courts, as they have in the past, in
determining whether a sentence is unreasonable.”).
65. 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
66. Id. at 341.
67. Id. at 351.
68. Id. at 347.
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More significantly, in Gall v. United States,69 the Supreme Court faced
the issue of “whether a court of appeals may apply a ‘proportionality test,’
and require that a sentence that constitutes a substantial variance from the
Guidelines be justified by extraordinary circumstances.”70 The Court
answered this question with an ambiguous no: all sentences must be
reviewed “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard,”71 but
“appellate courts may therefore take the degree of variance into account
and consider the extent of a deviation from the Guidelines.”72 District
courts remain compelled to consider the § 3553(a) factors when departing
from the Guidelines.73 However, the Gall Court expressly limited an
appellate court’s review in that “the court may not apply a presumption of
unreasonableness. It may consider the extent of the deviation, but must
give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors,
on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.”74
The same day the Court released Gall, it also issued its decision in
Kimbrough v. United States.75 The Kimbrough Court addressed the
controversy surrounding the large sentencing differential under the
Guidelines for crack cocaine offenses versus powder cocaine offenses. As
prescribed under the recommended Guidelines, there was a 100-to-1
weight ratio, yielding sentences three to six times longer for crack offenses
than for powder offenses involving the same quantity of drugs.76 In yet the
most drastic display of disregard for the Guidelines, the Kimbrough Court
allowed a district judge’s disagreement with the crack-to-powder ratio to
serve as a basis for a downward departure in an otherwise “unremarkable
drug-trafficking offense.”77 After considering the § 3553(a) factors, the
sentencing court found the Guideline-suggested sentence of nineteen years
unreasonable and imposed a sentence of fifteen years because it found that
69. 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
70. Id. at 40–41.
71. Id. at 41.
72. Id. at 47.
73. Id. at 49–50.
74. Id. at 51.
75. 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
76. Id. at 94–95. The Court explained that Congress believed the 100-to-1 ratio appropriate
because crack cocaine is significantly more dangerous than its powder counterpart for several
reasons:
(1) crack was highly addictive; (2) crack users and dealers were more likely to be
violent than users and dealers of other drugs; (3) crack was more harmful to users
than powder, particularly for children who had been exposed by their mothers’
drug use during pregnancy; (4) crack use was especially prevalent among
teenagers; and (5) crack’s potency and low cost were making it increasingly
popular.
Id. at 95–96.
77. Id. at 110.
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sufficient to accomplish the purposes of punishment.78 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed on the ground that a variance based
solely on disagreement with the Guidelines’ ratio of crack-to-powder
cocaine was per se unreasonable.79 The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth
Circuit and reinstated the lower court’s sentence on the logic that the
sentence was reasonable because the district court went through the
motions of considering the § 3553(a) factors.80
Similarly, in United States v. Spears,81 the Supreme Court, per curiam,
granted summary reversal for another ratio of crack-to-powder cocaine
sentence.82 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had vacated a
downward departure because the district court “categorically reject[ed]”
the Guidelines’ ratio of 100:1, adopting its own 20:1 ratio.83 The Court
emphatically drew the new battle line by declaring “that district courts are
entitled to reject and vary categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines
based on a policy disagreement with those Guidelines.” Overall,
Kimbrough and Spears created a precedential legacy that enables district
court judges to categorically reject a Guideline range simply because they
believe it yields too severe a result.84
C. Booker’s Aftermath: Current Sentencing Disparities, Guidelines,
and Policy Statements
Predictably, the rate at which courts imposed non-governmentsponsored, below-range sentences for child exploitation offenses decreased
following the PROTECT Act and increased after Booker.85 For child
pornography production offenses, the percentage of downward departures
fell slightly from 3.8% to 1.8% following the PROTECT Act, but they
sharply rose to 11.3% after Booker.86 For distribution and trafficking
offenses, the percentage rose from 12.2% to 19.1% following Booker.87
Perhaps most dramatic, departures for charges involving child pornography
possession ping-ponged with the passage of the PROTECT Act and
Booker: from 25% to 12.3% and to a new high of 26.3%.88 Clearly, Booker
78. Id. at 92–93.
79. Id. at 93.
80. Id. at 110–11.
81. 555 U.S. 261 (2009).
82. Id. at 262–63.
83. United States v. Spears (Spears II), 533 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
84. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 110 (holding that “it would not be an abuse of discretion for a
district court to conclude when sentencing a particular defendant that the crack/powder disparity
yields a sentence ‘greater than necessary’ to achieve § 3553(a)’s purposes, even in a mine-run case”
(emphasis added)).
85. FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 122.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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emboldened federal judges to grant downward departures more freely than
under both the mandatory Guidelines’ system and the PROTECT Act’s
requirements.
Even though Booker diminishes the Guidelines’ potency, the
sentencing court must first calculate the appropriate Guideline range and
consider the § 3553(a) factors before considering a downward departure.89
In evaluating reasons for downward departures for sexual abuse of children
offenses, the Guidelines’ policy statements specify narrow grounds when
downward departures are warranted based on diminished capacity90 and
aberrant behavior.91 Unless present to an unusual degree that would justify
a departure compared to typical Guidelines’ cases, the policy statements
encourage courts to disregard factors such as the defendant’s age,92 health
(unless so ill that home confinement is an effective alternative to
incarceration),93 and mental or emotional condition.94 Moreover, they
instruct courts to focus on the primary issue—criminal culpability—and
generally to ignore irrelevant factors: the defendant’s charitable donations,
public service, or prior good works,95 family ties and responsibilities,96 and
substance abuse problems.97
Inversely, the Guidelines provide policy statements advising
appropriate grounds for upward departures, such as when the offense
involves more than ten minors98 or the “conduct [is] unusually heinous,
cruel, brutal, or degrading to the victim.”99 These policy statements also
urge lifetime terms of supervised release following incarceration for all
cases of sex offenses against minors.100
II. GUIDELINE GUESSING
A. Eleventh Circuit Archetype: United States v. Irey
In United States v. Irey,101 the Eleventh Circuit characterized the
defendant’s criminal conduct as “virtually unparalleled in a ‘most
egregious and despicable’ field of crime.”102 Beginning in 2001, Irey
traveled to brothels in Asian countries to indulge in “sexually disordered
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (2010).
Id. § 5K2.20.
Id. §§ 5K2.22, 5H1.1.
Id. § 5H1.4.
Id. § 5H1.3.
Id. § 5H1.11.
Id. § 5H1.6.
Id. § 5H1.4.
Id. § 2G2.1 cmt.6.
Id. § 5K2.8.
Id. § 5D1.2(b).
612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
Id. at 1206 (quoting United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191, 1220 (11th Cir. 2009)).
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behavior.”103 Early in Irey’s Asian debut, he explored sex with Cambodian
children and discovered an appetite for raping, sodomizing, and sexually
torturing young girls.104 His debauchery continued over a four- or five-year
period, and he recounted engaging in sexual encounters “many many
times” with over fifty girls.105
Irey’s victims were underage and “abjectly impoverished” Cambodian
children, some as young as four years old and “perhaps the most vulnerable
of the world’s society.”106 Unlike the children, Irey was in his forties, stood
five feet ten inches tall, weighed 200 pounds, and was wealthy enough to
purchase these little girls’ bodies.107 He became “more and more obsessed
and was returning to Asia more and more often” to buy sex from these
young victims—at one point paying up to $1,500 per child and usually
purchasing multiple children at the same time.108 When Irey’s business in
China prevented him from traveling to them, he would pay to have girls
flown to him so that he could abuse them in his free time.109
Irey, dissatisfied that his repeated sexual predation remained private,
“scripted, cast, starred in, produced, and distributed worldwide some of the
most graphic and disturbing child pornography that has ever turned up on
the [I]nternet.”110 Irey memorialized his abuse both in videos and
photographs displaying his wide array of depravity: performing and
receiving oral sex from multiple prepubescent females, engaging in anal
and vaginal intercourse with prepubescent Asian females, marking girls’
bodies with arrows pointed toward their vaginal areas, binding children
with duct tape while raping them, and posing with nude prepubescent
children as trophies.111
Apparently these acts lacked sufficient vulgarity for Irey. He also
enjoyed sadistically torturing the children by inserting various objects such
as glow sticks, dildos, and candy into their vaginal cavities.112 Some of the
worst torture of the children included “Irey inserting a plastic tube into the
vagina of a prepubescent Asian female. Several of the images show the
plastic tube containing cockroaches crawling into the vagina of these
children [sic].”113 An accompanying image was titled, in all capital letters,
“Big Cock Push Bug Deep Into 9 Yo Girl, She Hurt in Pane” as it shows

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 1166 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1167.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Irey vaginally penetrating a prepubescent girl.114 This sexually suggestive
title exhibits Irey’s intent to widely distribute the image.115 Lest one
assume Irey felt guilt, several images show him smiling while inflicting the
sexual abuse.116
Irey traded his images to gain access to other purveyors’ child
pornography collections, disseminating his materials around the world.117
Irey’s shocking images were infamously dubbed the “pink wall series” due
to the pink walls seen in the background; the fact that they earned a sordid
nickname belies the widespread viewing of the children’s sexual torture.118
When agents seized over 1,200 images from Irey’s computer and reported
these images to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children,
more than 100 separate law enforcement agencies identified these images
in their investigations.119
On July 2, 2007, Irey pleaded “guilty to one count of violating 18
U.S.C. § 2251(c).”120 Irey voluntarily admitted he “[w]ent to––overseas
[sic], visited numerous brothels where they had underage children and
photographed them, had sex with them, and had them on [his] laptop when
[he] entered the United States.”121 The Presentence Report calculated the
final offense level at forty-three, producing a range of life imprisonment
according to the Guidelines.122 Unfortunately, because the government

114. Id. at 1168 (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. Child pornography offenders typically embed this sort of rhetoric into images in order to
increase Internet seekers’ access when searching for this disturbing content. See, e.g., Alison
Bonelli, Comment, Computer Searches in Plain View: An Analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s Decision
in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 759, 784 (2011)
(describing how a police officer found several files on a defendant’s computer saved under sexually
suggestive titles and, upon opening the files, discovered child pornography).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1168–69 (“The indictment alleged that he ‘did knowingly employ, use, persuade,
induce, entice, and coerce minors to engage in sexually explicit conduct outside the United States,
for the purpose of producing visual depictions of such conduct, and transporting such visual
depictions to the United States by any means . . . .’”).
121. Id. at 1169 (internal quotation marks omitted).
122. Id. The base offense level was thirty-two under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 2G2.1(a) because the offense involved sexually exploiting minors to produce child pornography.
In addition to the base offense level of thirty-two, § 2G2.1(b)(1) added four more levels because the
minors were under age twelve, § 2G2.1(b)(2)(A) added two more levels because the defendant
committed sexual acts himself, § 2G2.1(b)(3) added two more levels for distributing child
pornography, § 2G2.1(b)(4) added four more levels for portraying sadistic conduct, and § 3D1.4
added two more levels because of the grouping of multiple victims. After a three-level reduction,
two levels under § 3E1.1(a) for acceptance of responsibility and a single level under § 3E1.1(b) for
timely notification of intent to plead guilty, the Guidelines produced a final offense level of fortythree—the Guidelines’ maximum level. Id.
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only charged one count, the statutory maximum was thirty years,123 making
the new Guideline-recommended sentence 360 months (thirty years).124
The statute required a minimum of fifteen years incarceration.125
In anticipation of Irey’s defense of uncontrollable pedophilia, the
government urged the court that, although he may have “experience[d]
self-deceptive thought processes,” he “has horribly sexually abused
numerous children over a period of years” and any variance would be
unreasonable due to the serious nature of his offense.126 The defense
presented two expert witnesses, Dr. Fred Berlin and Dr. Ted Shaw.127 Dr.
Berlin testified that Irey is a pedophile and that “to the best of [his]
knowledge and belief, [Irey] has never coerced an unwilling person against
their [sic] will.”128 Most pertinently, he advised that, although pedophilia
develops outside of a volitional decision, Irey still had the capability and
responsibility to control his deviant sexual abuse of children, noting
“[e]ven without treatment, in the past, he had been able to refrain from any
sexual contact with children within the United States.”129
After doing a psychosexual evaluation of Irey, Dr. Shaw testified that
Irey had a low to moderate risk of recidivism.130 The court focused Dr.
Shaw’s attention on pedophilia and asked, “[F]rom a standpoint of
criminology, is a person who acts out as a result of this condition acting
totally of rational free will or is that person acting out as a result of
something that is in essence an illness that he at that point has no control
over?”131 Skillfully evading a definite answer, Dr. Shaw responded, “I
think that the fact [is] that pedophilia is not an underlying element for
competency or sanity—it is an Axis I, treatable disorder.”132 He explained
that pedophiles can control themselves: “[p]edophiles are capable of not reoffending, even if they have an urge, in the same way that compulsive
dessert eaters can choose to not eat dessert.”133

123. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(c), (e) (2006). The government could have easily avoided the
opportunity for an unreasonably low sentence by charging several counts of production, placing the
mandatory minimum Guideline sentence well above fifteen years.
124. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.1(a) (2010) (“Where the statutorily
authorized maximum sentence is less than the minimum of the applicable guideline range, the
statutorily authorized maximum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.”).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(c).
126. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1170 (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Id. at 1170, 1172.
128. Id. at 1171 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Eleventh Circuit explained that, given
the uncontroverted facts that Irey raped, sodomized, and tortured over fifty Cambodian children,
Irey obviously failed to disclose the full extent of his sexual escapades to Dr. Berlin. Id. at 1171 n.6.
129. Id. at 1171 (internal quotation marks omitted).
130. Id. at 1173.
131. Id. at 1174 (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
133. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In closing, defense counsel presented character witnesses—Irey’s wife,
daughter, and sons—who praised him as “a loving and wonderful husband
and father” and selfless member of the community.134 Counsel urged the
court to consider Irey’s actions in context of his “exemplary life.”135
Considering Dr. Shaw’s testimony, defense counsel contradictorily argued
“the behavior of a pedophile is not totally volitional, that is, it is dictated in
some degree by the disease itself.”136 Counsel concluded by asking the
court to consider that the defendant would be in his seventies upon release
if sentenced the full thirty years.137
The district court proceeded by observing the advisory nature of the
Guidelines and then reflected upon each § 3553(a) factor.138 The court
agreed with the prosecutor that the seriousness of the defendant’s offense
“rises to the very top” in terms of its horrific nature and impact.139 But the
court then made several remarkable comments about the characteristics of
the defendant: “Mr. Irey and his family and friends are also victims” of the
epidemic of internet child pornography; Irey has been “a good person to his
community”; Irey’s acts “were not purely volitional . . . [and] were due in
substantial part to a recognized illness [pedophilia]”; Irey has a low risk of
recidivism because his age upon release will prevent recidivism from a
“physiological standpoint”; and Irey’s loving family “says a lot . . . about
Mr. Irey himself.”140 The court diminished the value of deterrence as an
irrational consideration for those suffering from pedophilia,141 and it stated
that the government does not need to protect society from Irey beyond the
minimum sentence.142 In concluding the sentencing hearing, the court
stated, “It comes down to my view of what promotes respect for the law
and provides just punishment,” and imposed a 210-month (17.5-year)
sentence.143
The Eleventh Circuit initially affirmed the sentence144 and then, upon a
rehearing en banc, vacated the sentence and remanded with instructions to
impose the required thirty-year sentence.145 It explained that the
134. Id. at 1175 (internal quotation marks omitted).
135. Id. at 1176 (internal quotation marks omitted). Defense counsel urged that these actions
were “a compartmentalized area of his whole being that is a result of his pedophilia.” Id. at 1175
(internal quotation marks omitted).
136. Id. at 1175 (internal quotation marks omitted).
137. Id. at 1176.
138. Id. at 1177.
139. Id. at 1178 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006).
140. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1178 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(1) (2006).
141. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1179; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (2006).
142. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1179; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (2006).
143. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1179 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) (2006).
144. United States v. Irey, 563 F.3d 1223, 1224 (11th Cir. 2009).
145. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1224–25 (holding that because no downward departure is reasonable
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appropriate abuse-of-discretion standard of review “allows a range of
choice for the district court, so long as that choice does not constitute a
clear error of judgment.”146 Accordingly, that standard requires the court of
appeals to affirm a district court even when it would have imposed a
different sentence, so long as the district court’s decision was
reasonable.147 The Eleventh Circuit articulated three ways a district court
abuses its discretion: “when it (1) fails to afford consideration to relevant
factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an
improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in
considering the proper factors.”148 This abuse may occur when a district
court improperly balances the factors or weighs the factors
unreasonably.149 The reasonableness of the sentence depends on the totality
of the facts and circumstances in light of the § 3553(a) factors, which is a
question of law, not fact.150 The sentence will be vacated only if the court
of appeals is “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district
court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a)
factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable
sentences dictated by the facts of the case.”151
The Eleventh Circuit recognized the sentence as a breach of substantive
reasonableness, not procedural reasonableness—that is, even though the
district court’s sentence was procedurally reasonable because the court
nominally took into account the § 3553(a) factors, the sentence was still
substantively unreasonable when considered independently and
holistically.152 Consistent with its test for substantive reasonableness, it
considered each § 3553(a) factor anew in light of the district court’s factual
findings to determine whether there was an abuse of discretion. The court
flatly rejected characterizing Irey as a “victim,” both because the facts
showed he started viewing child pornography after having sex with
children and because “[c]hild molesters and the children who are their
victims do not occupy the same moral plane.”153 It found that the district
under the circumstances, the only available sentence is the Guideline range of thirty years).
146. Id. at 1189 (internal quotation marks omitted).
147. Id. (distinguishing abuse of discretion from de novo review).
148. Id. (quoting United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121, 1174 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1189–90 (explaining that explicit findings of fact by the district court will be
accepted, but that the importance of ignored, uncontroverted facts in the evaluation of § 3553(a)
factors is a question of law).
151. Id. at 1190 (quoting United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
152. Id. at 1194. Judge Tjoflat, writing separately, criticized the district court’s procedural
failure to make specific findings on the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors. Id. at 1234 (Tjoflat, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). However, the majority explicitly rejected this criticism and focused
instead on substantive reasonableness. Id. at 1195 (majority opinion).
153. Id. at 1198–99.
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court’s viewing of Irey as a victim tainted the court’s ability to properly
weigh the § 3553(a) factors, in particular “the nature and circumstances of
the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.”154
Next, the court found that the record did not support the finding that
pedophilia forced the defendant to rape these children.155 Rather, both
Dr. Shaw’s testimony and Irey’s consistent lack of offenses in the United
States, where detection is high, proved that Irey was capable of controlling
his lust for children.156 The court disagreed “‘with the apparent weighty
consideration that the sentencing judge gave to the notion that this
defendant acted on account of some type of “sickness.” The defendant
acted deliberately, cunningly and with obvious delight.’”157
Regarding the defendant’s family and community standing, the court
equated the district court’s findings to “saying that other than the fact he
had an ‘illness’ that made him want to kill young women, Ted Bundy was
a pretty nice guy.”158 The Eleventh Circuit held that any mitigation this
might suggest was heavily outweighed by the seriousness of Irey’s criminal
acts.159 Additionally, his age was an inappropriate factor to weigh against
the advisory sentence of the Guidelines.160
The Eleventh Circuit’s weighing of the § 3553(a) factors shows that an
appropriate balancing would focus on the purposes of punishment over the
defendant’s characteristics for this type of offense.161 Three purposes seem
controlling here: retribution for the egregious sex crimes against
impoverished children, deterrence of other child molesters regardless if the
district court disagrees with the policy, and incapacitation because of the
high risk to society of recidivism.162 In conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit
found that the district court afforded almost no consideration to the
Guidelines and policy statements as directed in § 3553(a).163 Therefore, it
The more fundamental problem with the district court’s recasting of Irey-thecriminal as Irey-the-victim is the legal premise behind it, one that suggests the
criminal is like his victims. Irey is the wrongdoer, the predator, the victimizer. The
little girls in Cambodia are the wronged, the prey, the victims. The district court
should have kept the two separate and not commingled them in its thinking. . . .
Suggesting that Irey, like those little children, was a victim is absurd.
Id. at 1199.
154. Id. at 1199 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
155. Id. at 1200.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1201–02 (quoting United States v. Irey, 563 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 2009) (Hill,
J., concurring)).
158. Id. at 1203.
159. Id. at 1205.
160. Id. at 1205–06.
161. Id. at 1206–17.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1217–22.
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vacated the district court’s sentence and remanded with the direction to
impose the only legally reasonable sentence: the statutory maximum thirtyyear term.164
B. Sentencing Confusion Across the Federal System
The district court in Irey joined many other district courts that
disproportionately emphasized the history and characteristics of a
defendant at the expense of the other § 3553(a) factors, thereby granting
erroneous downward departures. In United States v. Goldberg,165 the
defendant was convicted of child pornography possession, resulting in a
recommended Guideline sentence of sixty-three to seventy-eight months.166
Instead of discussing the heinous nature of the images (some showing adult
males vaginally penetrating two- or three-year olds), the district court
heavily weighed the defendant’s psychological treatment needs, deliberated
at length about the impact prison would have upon the defendant’s life, and
focused on the “possibility here that his life can go in a different way.”167
In the end, the district court sentenced him to a single day in prison.168
In United States v. Polito,169 the defendant was convicted of possession
of child pornography; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s sentence of five years probation, including one
year of house arrest,170 even though the Guidelines recommended a twentyseven to thirty-three month sentence.171 In discussing its reasons for
imposing a sentence below the Guidelines recommended range, the
sentencing court highlighted the defendant’s age and immaturity at the time
of the crime, finding that he “[n]ever intended to conduct predatory sexual
activities with children,” had no prior convictions, and would suffer
mentally from imprisonment.172 This probationary sentence supposedly
would deter similarly situated defendants.173
District judges also improperly allow their own personal psychological
views about child pornography offenses to affect their sentencing
decisions. In United States v. Goff,174 a middle-aged elementary school
teacher possessed 360 images of child pornography on his computer, some
164. Id. at 1224–25. But see United States v. Irey, 746 F.2d 1232 (M.D. Fla. 2010)
(responding to the Eleventh Circuit’s critique of the district court’s sentencing and explaining the
justifications for the below-range sentence).
165. 491 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2007).
166. Id. at 669.
167. Id. at 669–70.
168. Id. at 669.
169. 215 F. App’x 354 (5th Cir. 2007).
170. Id. at 355.
171. Id. at 356.
172. Id. at 356–57.
173. Id. at 357.
174. 501 F.3d 250 (3d Cir. 2007).
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displaying child rape and oral sex on prepubescent girls.175 “Interrupting
the prosecutor’s argument that child pornography possession is ‘a serious
matter and should be punished seriously,’” the sentencing court insisted the
offense was “truly a psychological crime. It is not a taking crime . . . almost
one might say a psychiatric crime.”176 The district court proceeded to
sentence Goff to only four months in prison, seventeen months below the
minimum sentence suggested by the Guidelines.177
In United States v. Pugh,178 the defendant pleaded guilty to possessing
sixty-eight images of child pornography, some including infants being
penetrated by adult males and little girls performing oral sex on adults.179
The advisory sentencing range placed the defendant between 97 and 120
months; however, the district court imposed a sentence of five years of
probation, finding Pugh’s possession to be “passive” and “incidental” to
his real goal of grooming online relationships with minors.180 The Eleventh
Circuit once again applied an appropriately stringent “reasonableness”
review to the district court’s sentence, vacating the probationary sentence
due to the lower court’s failure to consider all of the § 3553(a) factors in
favor of focusing primarily on “the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the defendant.”181
Lest it be assumed these instances are anomalies, many district courts
simply embrace the view that their policy disagreements with the
Guidelines suffice as legitimate reasons to discard the recommended
sentences for child pornography offenses.182 Under § 2G2.2, the U.S.
175. Id. at 251, 252 n.1, 258.
176. Id. at 258 (internal quotation marks omitted). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit vehemently disagreed:
Children are exploited, molested, and raped for the prurient pleasure of Goff and
others who support suppliers of child pornography. These small victims may rank
as “no one else” in Goff’s mind, but they do indeed exist outside his mind. Their
injuries and the taking of their innocence are all too real. There is nothing “casual”
or theoretical about the scars they will bear from being abused for Goff’s
advantage. Far from persuading us that Goff’s crime was relatively minor, his
efforts to downplay the harm his actions have inflicted on others serve chiefly to
highlight the concern the District Court should have had with Goff’s failure to
appreciate the seriousness of his offense.
Id. at 259.
177. Id. at 253 & n.5.
178. 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008).
179. Id. at 1182.
180. Id. at 1187.
181. Id. at 1192, 1194 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
182. United States v. Diaz, 720 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1041 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (citing United States
v. Tews, No. 09-CR-309, 2010 WL 1608951, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 20, 2010); United States v.
Manke, No. 09-CR-172, 2010 WL 307937, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 19, 2010); United States v.
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Sentencing Guidelines Manual authorizes sentencing enhancements if the
pornography offense involved pecuniary gain, more than ten images, the
use of the Internet, or sadistic and masochistic conduct.183 District courts
that disagree with these policies blatantly ignore them, calling § 2G2.2 “an
eccentric Guideline of highly unusual provenance which, unless carefully
applied, can easily generate unreasonable results.”184 Whether the
sentencing courts openly dismiss the Guidelines’ policies or simply focus
upon the characteristics of the defendant while disregarding the other
§ 3553(a) factors, the three purposes of punishment in the child
pornography context—retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation—should
trump these erroneous considerations to confirm the severity of the
Guidelines’ sentences.185 In Part III, this Note addresses the three
controlling purposes of punishment in the child pornography context:
retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation. While rehabilitation is a valid
§ 3553(a) factor, it does not seem to be lacking in many sentencing courts’
rationales; rather, rehabilitation is often elevated above the other three
purposes of punishment and dominates these courts’ reasoning in granting
downward departures.
III. PURPOSES OF PUNISHMENT
Child pornography offenders pose a unique pragmatic and moral threat
to our society because they pose a high risk of recidivism and their heinous
crimes demand retribution.186 The Guidelines respond to this threat by
providing a structured method of punishment that accurately reflects
Americans’ moral beliefs concerning the seriousness of these offenses.187
Johnson, 588 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1001 (S.D. Iowa 2008); United States v. Baird, 580 F. Supp. 2d 889,
890–92 (D. Neb. 2008); United States v. Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1005–07 (E.D. Wis.
2008)).
183. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (2010).
184. Diaz, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 1041 (quoting United States v. Dorvee, 604 F.3d 84, 98 (2d Cir.
2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
185. Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1194–1200 (discussing how the court failed to weigh sufficiently the
need for retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation).
186. For an argument that views sentencing as a political process in order “to deploy both
practical wisdom and empirical analysis” and thereby to prevent arbitrary sentences, see Alice
Ristroph, How (Not) to Think Like a Punisher, 61 FLA. L. REV. 727, 728 (2009).
187. President Bush, speaking on behalf of the American people, emphasized the important
retributive and deterrent value of strengthening laws (including those against child pornography)
which protect children:
Protecting our children is our solemn responsibility. It’s what we must do. When a
child’s life or innocence is taken it is a terrible loss—it’s an act of unforgivable
cruelty. Our society has a duty to protect our children from exploitation and
danger. By enacting this law we’re sending a clear message across the country:
those who prey on our children will be caught, prosecuted and punished to the
fullest extent of the law.
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Yet many federal judges disagree with the severity of these recommended
sentences for child pornography offenses, and they express this frustration
with the policy objectives of the Guidelines by granting downward
sentencing departures.188 In doing so, courts fail to consider appropriately
the § 3553(a) factors related to the purposes of punishment—the very
procedure the Supreme Court emphasized in Booker as necessary to
maintain balanced sentencing.189 Justice requires that courts adhere to the
democratically decided Guidelines which express the high moral
culpability of these crimes, deter other potential offenders, and prevent the
realistic threat of recurring sexual offenses.190
A. Retribution
The gravity of child pornography offenses can hardly be overstated:
“[it] is a vile, heinous crime”191 and “among the most egregious and
despicable of societal and criminal offenses.”192 The Guidelines serve
retribution by punishing defendants who exploit children through
producing, possessing, and distributing child pornography.193 Nevertheless,
some district courts believe that the possession and distribution of child
pornography are victimless crimes with overinflated Guidelines
Press Release, Statement by President George W. Bush upon signing H.R. 4472, P.L. 109–248,
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (July 27, 2006), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/07/print/20060727-6.html.
188. See supra Section II.B. For an example of a judge increasing a sentence based on an
extraneous finding of a “child pornography gene,” see Debra Cassens Weiss, Federal Judge’s
Theories About a Child Porn Gene Get Him Tossed from Case, A.B.A. J. (2011) (reporting that,
after reviewing U.S. District Court Judge Gary Sharpe’s theory of a child pornography gene, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals found it “impermissible for the court to base its decision of
recidivism on its unsupported theory of genetics” (quoting United States v. Cossey, 632 F.3d 82, 88
(2d Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted)), available at http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/2nd_circuit_tosses_judge_from_case_because_of_his_theories_about_a_child_po/; Elie
Mystal, Judge of the Day: Sentence Based on Judge’s Genetic Theory Overturned, ABOVE THE LAW
(Jan. 31, 2011, 2:07 PM) (arguing that “the issue of recidivism when it comes to child porn
‘aficionados’ is a serious one. . . . [and] [w]e don’t need rogue judges going off on their own pet
theories”), http://abovethelaw.com/2011/01/judge-of-the-day-sentence-based-on-judges-genetictheories-overturned/#.
189. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(D) (2006); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260–61
(2005).
190. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: PROTECT ACT (2003), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2003/April/03_ag_266.htm (explaining how the “PROTECT Act of
2003” protects American children by better equipping law enforcement, increasing penalties for
child sex offenses, and strengthening laws against constitutionality attacks).
191. United States v. Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d 844, 847 (N.D. Ohio 2010).
192. United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191, 1220 (11th Cir. 2009).
193. Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L. REV. 847, 855
(2008) (explaining the two primary rationales behind child pornography laws: “(1) to punish for the
harm inflicted by the production, distribution and possession of child pornography and (2) to
protect against future harm that may occur if child pornography is not stamped out”).
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sentences.194 Aside from the obvious physical injuries the children
suffer,195 the children endure permanent psychological and emotional
damage knowing that predators are continuously circulating and enjoying
these heinous images.196 Moreover, the ease of acquiring and distributing
these illegal images does not reduce the culpability of defendants.197
Therefore, the severity of the recommended Guidelines appropriately
fulfills the retributive purpose of punishment,198 and courts should
recognize the seriousness of these offenses when weighing the § 3553(a)
factors.199
B. Deterrence
“The more serious the crime and the greater the defendant’s role in it,
the more important it is to send a strong and clear message that will deter
others.”200 The Guidelines recommend high sentences for child
pornography offenders to adequately deter other potential criminals.201
Some courts, however, doubt the deterrent value for potential child
pornography offenders on the theory that many would be psychologically
diagnosed as “pedophiles” and would lack some volitional control.202
194. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 588 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1004 (S.D. Iowa 2008) (stating
that Congress’ “tinkering with the [G]uidelines” wrongly places most defendants near the statutory
maximum). But see Rogers, supra note 193 (advocating the view that possession of child
pornography hurts real victims and debunking the misperception of it as a victimless crime).
195. Rogers, supra note 193, at 853 (describing the physical injuries related to sexual abuse as
including “genital bruising, cuts, lacerations and sexually transmitted diseases”).
196. Id. “At a more fundamental level, child pornography victims’ rights of privacy and human
dignity are violated when their images are circulated and viewed by others.” Id. at 854.
197. United States v. Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d 844, 853 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (“[T]he
[c]ourt has never before seen an argument that because a crime is easy to commit, it should be
punished less severely.”). Contra TROY STABENOW, DECONSTRUCTING THE MYTH OF CAREFUL
STUDY: A PRIMER ON THE FLAWED PROGRESSION OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES 26–27
(2009) (suggesting that the “common, first-time offender” unfairly reaches the statutory maximum
because it is so easy to use the Internet to download and share images), available at
http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/child%20porn%20july%20revision.pdf.
198. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2006).
199. Ironically, even when courts do not fully weigh the retributive function, American
inmates express their disgust with these crimes by subjecting violent sexual offenders to greater
instances of inmate-on-inmate sexual victimization, both in prisons and jails across the country.
ALLEN J. BECK & PAIGE M. HARRISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN PRISONS AND JAILS REPORTED BY INMATES, 2008–09 16 ( 2010), available
at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/svpjri0809.pdf (finding that an estimated 4.6% of
prisoners held for violent sexual offenses reported being sexually victimized by another inmate,
while only 2.2% of other violent prisoners reported inmate-on-inmate sexual victimization, with
successively lower percentages for nonviolent offenders).
200. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1212 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
201. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (2006).
202. See, e.g., Irey, 612 F.3d at 1179. See Weiss, supra note 188, and Mystal, supra note 188,
for a discussion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacating a district court finding
that an immutable characteristic of the defendant was a “child pornography gene.”
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Contrary to these judicial findings, both expert psychologists who
testified in Irey flatly refuted this “illness causation” theory.203 Dr. Shaw
equated potential defendants’ control over pedophiliac urges to the control
compulsive dessert eaters must exercise.204 Dr. Berlin stated that Irey
(diagnosed with pedophilia) had the ability to refrain from sexual contact,
an ability he exhibited while living in the United States, as well as the
responsibility to control his conduct.205 The Eleventh Circuit echoed this
expert testimony, finding that pedophilia does not force people to rape
children.206 In fact, forensic psychologists confirm that, although
pedophilia might be a permanent condition, it does not absolve the person
from accountability for his actions nor render him incapable of managing
his pedophiliac tendencies.207 Consequently, pedophiles control their
volitional ability and possess their rational faculties and therefore will be
deterred by the severity of the Guidelines.
C. Incapacitation
Exactly how is the sentencing court to know which factors accurately
predict recidivism, thereby “protect[ing] the public from further crimes of
the defendant”?208 The Eleventh Circuit defined adequate protection as a
function of two variables: “the level of risk that conduct will occur and the
level of harm that will be inflicted if that conduct does occur.”209
Regarding the level of harm, all nine Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court
agreed that “[l]ong-term studies show that sexual abuse is grossly intrusive
in the lives of children and is harmful to their normal psychological,
emotional and sexual development in ways which no just or humane
society can tolerate.”210 Therefore, only the level of risk remains to be
determined.
1. Recidivism Rates and Undetected Contact Offenses
A great amount of public debate centers upon the recidivism rates and
undetected sexual contact offenses of those convicted of possession,
distribution, and production of child pornography.211 There is no
203. Supra Section II.A.
204. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1174.
205. Id. at 1171.
206. United States v. Irey, 563 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 2009) (Hill, J., concurring).
207. Ryan C.W. Hall & Richard C.W. Hall, A Profile of Pedophilia: Definition,
Characteristics of Offenders, Recidivism, Treatment Outcomes, and Forensic Issues, 82 MAYO
CLINIC PROC. 457, 465 (2007); Telephone Interview with Howard R. Bernstein, Ph.D., Forensic
Psychologist and Expert Witness (Oct. 20, 2010).
208. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (2006).
209. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1217.
210. Id. at 1207 (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 468 (2008)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
211. Michael C. Seto & Angela W. Eke, The Criminal Histories and Later Offending of Child
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publication documenting the actual recidivism rates of these offenders,212
primarily because their offenses are hidden from law enforcement or
require self-reporting by the offenders themselves.213
The highly controversial Butner Study214 strongly indicates that the vast
majority of child pornographers have already committed contact
offenses.215 In the Butner Study, clinical psychologists Michael Bourke and
Andres Hernandez analyzed data from 155 sexual offenders who
voluntarily participated in an eighteen-month, intensive treatment program
at the medium-security federal prison in Butner, North Carolina.216 The
participant pool drew solely from inmates whose instant offenses involved
possession, distribution, or receipt of child pornography (production and
contact offenses were eliminated), and the study excluded an additional
forty-six subjects who failed to complete at least six months in the
program.217 At the time of sentencing, 74% of the subjects had no prior
documented contact offenses as identified by the Presentence Investigation
Report (PSIR),218 defining a “contact offense” as a previous conviction,
self-reported acknowledgment, or substantiated allegation of a sexual
contact offense.219 Also at the time of sentencing, the number of known
victims totaled seventy-five, or 1.88 victims per offender.220 By the
conclusion of treatment, 85% of the participants admitted they had
committed at least one hands-on offense and reported victimizing a total of

Pornography Offenders, 17 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 201, 201 (2005); see also Hall &
Hall, supra note 207, at 460 (“It is unknown how many individuals have pedophilic fantasies and
never act on them or who do act but are never caught.”).
212. Seto & Eke, supra note 211, at 201–02; Hall & Hall, supra note 207, at 467 (reporting
that “the rate of recidivism against a child is also unknown”).
213. Although no data directly indicate the likelihood of future offending, the study conducted
by Seto and Eke evaluated the post-release criminal records of child pornography offenders. Their
analysis found that the average risk time was 2.5 years, where 17% of the sample committed the
offense again during this period and 4% committed a new contact sexual offense. Seto & Eke, supra
note 211, at 205–06.
214. Some defendants and courts have criticized the Butner Study findings on the reasoning
that evidence of other individuals’ contact offenses does not establish the particular defendant’s
likelihood of recidivism, as well as on the belief that the Butner Study was potentially coercive. See,
e.g., United States v. Johnson, 588 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1006 (S.D. Iowa 2008).
215. Bourke & Hernandez, supra note 2, at 183.
216. Id. at 185.
217. Id. at 186. The directors explained that they excluded the additional forty-six inmates
because “offenders seldom disclose their entire sexual offense history upon initial participation in
treatment programs.” Id. Additionally, the program included approximately fifteen hours per week
of “structured and unstructured therapeutic activities. . . . Inmates participate[d] in a comprehensive
psychosexual evaluation that include[ed] objective psychological tests, psychophysiological
examination (polygraph), and phallometric assessment.” Id. at 185.
218. Id. at 187.
219. Id. at 186.
220. Id. at 187.
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1,777 children, an average of 13.56 victims per offender.221 This dramatic
difference between what the sentencing judges knew through the PSIRs
and what actually occurred bolsters the authors’ finding that “[t]he vast
majority of the participants in our treatment program report that they
committed acts of hands-on abuse prior to seeking child pornography via
the Internet.”222
Furthermore, findings from the National Institute of Justice indicate
that child molesters sexually assault 8.1% of adolescents in the United
States,223 while other studies report up to 31% of females and 16% of
males encounter “unwanted sexual contact” before reaching age
eighteen.224 Even more alarming, only “[a]n estimated 1 in 20 cases of
child sexual abuse is reported or identified.”225 The Butner Study and these
other statistics strongly imply that many child pornography offenders have
already committed, or will commit upon release, sexual offenses that will
likely remain undetected. Consequently, downward departures from the
Guidelines predicated on a low level of recidivism or the lack of victim
impact are substantially unwarranted, even for defendants with no prior
criminal record.
2. Pedophilia and Predictive Risk Factors
Although no verifiable recidivism rates exist for child pornography
offenders as a general population,226 there are established risk factors that
increase the likelihood of repeat offending. Pedophilia, defined as “a
persistent sexual interest in prepubescent children,”227 is perhaps the best
predictive risk factor.228 “[C]hild pornography offenses are a valid
221. Id.
222. Id. at 189; see also United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1198–99 (11th Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (showing that prior to sentencing, “Irey stated that he did not start viewing child pornography
on the internet until after he had begun having sex with the little girls in Cambodia”).
223. DEAN G. KILPATRICK, BENJAMIN E. SAUNDERS & DANIEL W. SMITH, NAT’L INST. OF
JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, YOUTH VICTIMIZATION: PREVALENCE AND IMPLICATIONS 4 (2003)
[hereinafter YOUTH VICTIMIZATION]. In addition to the 8.1% national statistic, the authors estimate
that there are 1.8 million victims of actual sexual assaults. Id.
224. Hall & Hall, supra note 207, at 460.
225. Id.; see also YOUTH VICTIMIZATION, supra note 223, at 6 (confirming that 86% of
adolescent sexual assault victims do not report these attacks).
226. Michael C. Seto, James M. Cantor & Ray Blanchard, Child Pornography Offenses Are a
Valid Diagnostic Indicator of Pedophilia, 115 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 610, 614 (2006).
227. Id. at 610 (citing the American Psychiatric Association for the definition of pedophilia).
“[A] pedophile is an individual who fantasizes about, is sexually aroused by, or experiences sexual
urges toward prepubescent children (generally <13 years) for a period of at least 6 months.” Hall &
Hall, supra note 207, at 457.
228. In a statistical study comparing the re-offense rates over time of child molesters (not
synonymous with pedophiles) and rapists, researchers discovered that “child molesters were 100
percent more likely than rapists to commit a new sexual crime by year 25.” TORI DEANGELIS, NEW
RESEARCH REVEALS WHO MAY MOLEST AGAIN, www.angelfire.com/mi/collateral/research8.html
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diagnostic indicator of pedophilia,”229 and these offenders “showed
significantly greater sexual arousal to children than did hands on sexual
offenders (child molesters).”230 Published recidivism rates for a pedophile
range from 10% to 50% depending on the individual’s sexual
proclivities.231 Yet these statistics underestimate the true figure because
“many treatment studies do not include treatment dropout figures, cannot
calculate the number of repeated offenses that are not reported, and do not
use polygraphs to confirm self-reports.”232 These rates apply only to
individuals during active follow-up treatment periods.233
Pedophilia is interrelated with other predictive risk factors, including
sadism and age.234 Fifty to seventy percent of pedophiles are also
diagnosed with other paraphilia,235 and such “deviant sexual preferences
may be the strongest prediction for new sexual offense[s].”236 The
Guidelines’ policy statements encourage sentencing departures based on
age only when present to an “unusual degree” and suggest the motivation
for age departures is that other forms of punishment, such as home
confinement for the elderly, are just as efficient.237 Accordingly, the
Eleventh Circuit recently reaffirmed that “[a]lthough recidivism ordinarily
decreases with age, we have rejected this reasoning as a basis for a
sentencing departure for certain classes of criminals, namely sex
offenders.”238 Yet some courts perceive age as a mitigating factor on the
theory that an offender’s physiological deterioration decreases his sexual
arousal towards children. However, studies show that a sex offender’s age
does not slow commission of his crimes, and he is likely to begin or
continue offending in his elder years.239 When analyzed in a group with
rapists and sexual sadists, pedophiles constitute 60% of all older sexual
offenders (ages forty to seventy).240 Other predictive factors include:
antisocial personality traits “characterized by callousness, cynicism, and
(last visited Sept. 19, 2011).
229. Seto, Cantor & Blanchard, supra note 226, at 610.
230. Howard Bernstein, The Case of the United States of America v. Jeremy Mohr 6 (2010)
(unpublished records review of the Psychosexual Evaluation Report prepared by Dr. Ted Shaw, on
file with author) (citing to MICHAEL C. SETO, ASSESSING THE RISK POSED BY CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
OFFENDERS 5 (2009), available at http://www.iprc.unc.edu/G8/Seto_Position_ Paper.pdf).
231. Hall & Hall, supra note 207, at 467.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 458.
235. Id.
236. Bernstein, supra note 230, at 5.
237. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.1 (2010).
238. United States v. Jayyousi, No. 08-10494, 2011 WL 4346322, at *21 (11th Cir. Sept. 19,
2011).
239. Matt Hart, Note, The Geriatric Sex Offender: Senile or Pedophile?, 32 L. & PSYCHOL.
REV. 153, 153 (2008).
240. Hall & Hall, supra note 207, at 458.
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contempt for the feelings, rights, and suffering of others;”241 previous
sexual offenses;242 denial, rationalization, and projection of guilt;243 and
prior adult convictions.244
In sum, courts should consider the graphic nature of the child
pornography the defendant actually possessed, distributed, or produced.
Unlike other crimes, child pornography offenses open a window into the
mind of a defendant: the court can literally see what sort of images a
defendant intentionally sought out to sexually gratify himself. Masochistic
and sadistic acts pose a greater threat to society, necessitating
incapacitation; sexual victimization of numerous children is more culpable,
demanding retribution; and intentional delight in a victim’s suffering
displays cognitive rationality, requiring deterrence. Taken together, these
purposes of punishment validate the severity of the Guidelines’ sentences.
IV. REACHING REFORM
To honor the spirit of Booker and preserve sentencing uniformity
across the federal system, district courts should routinely sentence
defendants within the calculated Guidelines range instead of inserting their
own personal views into the equation.245 To ensure balance, sentencing
departures should be made only for grievous circumstances that the
Commission has failed to take into account because the Commission has
already factored in the likely value of deterrence, moral culpability, and
detrimental impact on society.246 By disregarding the Guidelines and its
policy statements, district courts discount the accumulated institutional
knowledge of the Commission.247 However, because the Supreme Court is
241. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005) (citing AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 701–06 (4th ed. 2000)).
242. Seto & Eke, supra note 211, at 207 (finding that child pornography offenders who had
committed prior contact offenses were the most likely to repeat offend, either sexually or generally).
243. Bernstein, supra note 230, at 4.
244. Naomi J. Freeman & Jeffrey C. Sandler, Female and Male Sex Offenders: A Comparison
of Recidivism Patterns and Risk Factors, 23 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1394, 1397 (2008);
Bernstein, supra note 230, at 4–6 (discussing risk recidivism and recidivism research).
245. See generally SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 28, at 1 (identifying the U.S. Sentencing
Commission as an independent agency in the judicial branch).
246. Cf. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1210–11 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“The
sentencing judge’s skepticism about deterring these types of crimes is not shared by Congress, the
Sentencing Commission, the Supreme Court, this Court, or other courts of appeals.”).
247. Although the Irey en banc panel provides a good estimation of “reasonableness review,”
the Guidelines still provide a more perceptible estimation of justice in sentencing than the
ambiguous instruction of “reasonableness”:
[A]fter nearly twenty years of guidelines sentencing, after hundreds of judicial
opinions construing the guidelines, after scores of scholarly articles appraising the
supposed virtues and claimed vices of the guidelines, after the accumulation and
evaluation of volumes of data by the Sentencing Commission, and after protracted
deliberation by Congress, including the investment of a mountain of public
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unlikely to reverse itself and suddenly declare mandatory Guidelines
constitutional, and district courts continue to grant downward departures,
alternative approaches are needed to implement the policies supporting the
Guidelines.
This Part analyzes the weaknesses of some current suggestions for
redressing sentencing disparities and then presents three workable
solutions: one legislative solution and two judicial solutions. The
legislative solution, which would narrow the statutory sentencing range for
child pornography offenses, is tenable, except that political constraints
make it unlikely to occur. The first judicial solution, which would reverse
the reasoning of Kimbrough and Spears, fulfills the goal of uniform
sentencing according to the Guidelines’ policies; however, judicial
preferences also make its implementation unlikely. The second judicial
solution, which would enforce a more stringent appellate review as
illustrated by the Eleventh Circuit, proves the only feasible solution to
remedy unwarranted sentencing departures from the Guidelines that courts
of appeals might implement in the near future.
A. Incomplete Responses
Some potential solutions focus on the sentencing judge: judges should
give great significance to the nature of the offense, strictly conform to the
goals of punishment, and avoid sentencing disparities for defendants
convicted of similar offenses.248 If followed, these suggestions would
strengthen sentencing. Realistically, however, earnestly admonishing
judges to consider the § 3553(a) factors falls utterly short of a viable
solution, given that federal courts already claim to weigh all the factors.
Other solutions focus on the appellate court: for instance, Lindsay C.
Harrison argues that when a court of appeals reviews a sentence to
determine whether it is substantively unreasonable, it should give great
deference to the district court’s “institutional competence” in sentencing.249
This “special expertise” arises from the trial judge’s immediate perception

resources, the Supreme Court abruptly disengaged the most thorough and carefully
considered regime of criminal sentencing in history and (by the margin of one
vote) substituted a two-word regime of criminal sentencing (perhaps the most
abbreviated in history)—the regime of the “reasonable sentence,” now informed
only to some indeterminate and controversial extent by the Sentencing Guidelines.
Griffin, supra note 28, at 467–68 n.92 (quoting United States v. Valencia-Aguirre, 409 F. Supp. 2d
1358, 1364–65 (M.D. Fla. 2006)).
248. Loren Rigsby, Comment, A Call for Judicial Scrutiny: How Increased Judicial Discretion
Has Led to Disparity and Unpredictability in Federal Sentencings for Child Pornography, 33
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1319, 1341–45 (2010).
249. Lindsay C. Harrison, Appellate Discretion and Sentencing After Booker, 62 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1115, 1156–57 (2008).
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of the defendant.250 Harrison urged that the judge’s sentence, based upon
individualized facts, should trump an appellate court’s balancing of general
principles against the particular defendant.251 However, because 92% of
child pornography defendants plead guilty,252 sentencing hearings
frequently furnish district court judges with their first meaningful
encounter with these defendants. In designing the Guidelines, the
Commission analyzed a broad range of information with the goal of
establishing fair and uniform sentencing policies that incorporate the
purposes of punishment and avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.253
Thus, the Guidelines should presumptively apply over an “individualized”
assessment in the vast majority of child pornography cases, as there is little
opportunity for personal exposure by the judge to the defendant before the
actual sentencing.254
In a different direction, some commentators have suggested alternative
methods of punishment to better reduce recidivism and to fulfill the
purposes of punishment. Chemical castration, accomplished through
periodic medical injections, offers the benefit of reducing offenders’
testosterone levels,255 attempting to suppress deviant sexual urges and thus
lower recidivism rates upon release.256 However, it presents drawbacks, as
well: besides possibly violating the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment,257 government-forced medication
250. Id. at 1157 & n.218 (citing Maurice Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court
Discretion, 79 F.R.D. 173, 182 (1978)). Professor Maurice Rosenberg describes the special
expertise as a “you are there” rationale, elaborating:
As one trial judge pungently phrased it, he “smells the smoke of battle” and can
get a sense of the interpersonal dynamics between the lawyers and the jury. That is
a sound and proper reason for conferring a substantial measure of respect to the
trial judge’s ruling whenever it is based on facts or circumstances that are critical
to [the] decision and that the record imperfectly conveys.
Rosenberg, supra, at 183.
251. Harrison, supra note 249, at 1157–58.
252. MARK MOTIVANS & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEX EXPLOITATION OFFENDERS, 2006, at 5 (2007),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fpcseo06.pdf.
253. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 28, at 1.
254. Cf. Harrison, supra note 249, at 1156–58 (advocating that “you are there” rationales
support deference to district court sentences based on their special expertise in imposing sentences
on individualized facts and defendants).
255. Carlson, supra note 16, at 30.
256. Loretta J. Stalans, Adult Sex Offenders on Community Supervision: A Review of Recent
Assessment Strategies and Treatment, 31 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 564, 568–69 (2004).
257. Carlson, supra note 16, at 31–32. Compare State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 747, 758 (La.
1992) (holding that forced medication of an insane death row prisoner to render him competent was
unconstitutional and “the intrusion represents an extremely severe interference with that person’s
liberty”), with Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1026–27 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
832 (2003) (holding that a “State does not violate the Eighth Amendment” by forcibly medicating
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also requires reliable probationers who willingly receive weekly
injections.258 Further, chemical castration coupled with less severe
sentences emphasizes incapacitation at the expense of retribution and
deterrence.
Dr. Robert Prentky, a clinical researcher, believes that long-term,
intensive supervision and treatment offer the best remedies for reducing
recidivism rates.259 While post-conviction treatment reduces the risk of
recidivism, “a significant percentage of sex offenders are prematurely
expelled from or drop out of treatment. . . . Termination rates in the United
States outpatient treatment programs have ranged from one quarter to more
than one half of adult sex offenders . . . .”260 More alarming still,
“[i]ndividuals can offend again while in active psychotherapy, while
receiving pharmacologic treatment, and even after castration.”261
Accordingly, although treatment might reduce recidivism for the
participants who willingly complete it, it cannot replace the role of
retribution and deterrence that sufficient sentences, in accordance with the
Guidelines, guarantee.
B. A Legislative Solution
Following Booker, legislative efforts to curb judicial activism in
sentencing have been handicapped. The current Guidelines’ policy
statements already direct courts that community involvement, as measured
through family ties and responsibilities, are ordinarily irrelevant when
determining criminal culpability.262 They also discourage courts from
considering issues such as age,263 physical condition, 264 and mental or
emotional condition,265 unless present to an “unusual degree” that would
necessitate a departure compared to other cases covered by the Guidelines.
If Congress were to enact legislation stating that such factors are
impermissible considerations, then one of two alternatives would occur:
either judges would simply avoid referencing these factors in sentencing
while continuing to impose lesser sentences than recommended by the
Guidelines, or judicial determinations of certain facts would fail as
violating the Sixth Amendment, as the Supreme Court held in Booker.266
The only effective legislative response is to raise the statutory minimum
death row inmates to render them competent to be executed because the “due process interests in
life and liberty . . . have been foreclosed by the lawfully imposed sentence”).
258. Carlson, supra note 16, at 31–32.
259. DEANGELIS, supra note 228.
260. Stalans, supra note 256, at 573, 576.
261. Hall & Hall, supra note 207, at 465.
262. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (2010).
263. Id. § 5H1.1.
264. Id. § 5H1.4.
265. Id. § 5H1.3.
266. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 234, 267–68 (2005).
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sentences in child pornography offenses, preventing rogue courts from
giving unreasonably low sentences.267
C. Judicial Solutions
The U.S. Supreme Court and courts of appeals could respond to the
current trend of downward departures by limiting the application of
Kimbrough268 and Spears.269 In both cases, the Court held that district
courts could replace the Guidelines’ 100:1 ratio for crack-to-powder
cocaine offenses with its own evaluation of the appropriate ratio.270 Some
courts point to these decisions as authorizing district court judges to grant
downward departures based solely on other policy disagreements with the
Guidelines.271 In the summer of 2010, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing
Act of 2010, which legislatively reduced the ratio from 100:1 to 18:1 for
crack-to-powder cocaine.272 Hence, Congress resolved the highly
publicized debate over the racially charged issue of crack-to-powder
cocaine,273 and appellate courts could return to finding that policy
disagreements with the Guidelines do not ordinarily constitute valid
reasons for sentencing reductions.274 Indeed, judicial disagreement over the
267. See United States v. Johnson, 588 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1004 (S.D. Iowa 2008) (suggesting
that “[i]f Congress does not want the courts to sentence individual defendants throughout that range
based on the facts and circumstances of each case, then Congress should amend the sentencing
statute, rather than manipulate the advisory guidelines”).
268. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
269. Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261 (2009).
270. Id. at 264–65; Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 110–11.
271. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz-Apolonio, No. 10-50306, 2011 WL 4060803, at *8 (9th
Cir. Sept. 14, 2011) (stating that “[a] sentencing court, of course, has the discretion to grant a
variance from the Guidelines . . . based on its policy disagreement with the existing Guidelines
provision”); United States v. Fumo, No. 09-3388, 2011 WL 3672774, at *31 (3d Cir. Sept. 15,
2011) (explaining that policy disagreements with the Guidelines may support a valid departure, but
noting that the sentencing court should explain the reasoning behind the disagreement).
272. Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
21 and 28 U.S.C.) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)); see also Scott Wilson, Obama Signs Fair
Sentencing Act, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/08/obamasigns-fair-sentencing-ac.html.
273. See Wilson, supra note 272; see also Editorial, Crack Breakthrough: The Fair Sentencing
Act of 2010 Corrects a Long-Time Wrong in Cocaine Penalties, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2010, at A14,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/02/AR201008020
4360.html.
274. See United States v. Cossey, 632 F.3d 82, 87–88 (2d Cir. 2011). The Second Circuit
reversed the district court’s sentence of a child pornography possession offense because it was
erroneously based upon the judge’s “unsupported belief that Cossey was prevented from controlling
his behavior due to a genetic inability [to do so] . . . .” Id. at 85–89. The sentencing judge rejected
the plea agreement’s recommended sentence and discarded the findings of two psychological
evaluations because of his personal views of recidivism. Id. at 87. In the district court’s words,
therapy “can only lead, in my view, to a sincere effort on your part to control, but you can’t get rid
of it. You are what you’re born with. And that’s the only explanation for what I see here.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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relative seriousness of particular crimes and sentencing policy objectives,
coupled with the personal biases of individual judges, originally caused the
vast sentencing disparities that prompted Congress to create the
Guidelines.275 Although policy disagreements prove to be the source of the
troublesome sentencing disparities,276 it is likely that the precedential value
of Kimbrough and Spears will not be lightly abandoned by district
courts.277
For the above reasons, this Note urges courts of appeals to follow the
Eleventh Circuit’s lead in evaluating downward sentencing departures,
particularly by doing their own independent evaluations of sentences in
light of the § 3553(a) factors and requiring specific § 3553(a) factors to
justify any variance. As the Eleventh Circuit stated, “We will not quit the
post that we have been ordered to hold in sentencing review and the
responsibility that goes with it.”278 The Eleventh Circuit vacated the
original sentence in Irey that significantly departed downward from the
Guidelines,279 employing a much more rigorous and independent
evaluation of “reasonableness” than previous panels from the Eleventh
Circuit or other courts of appeals have utilized.280 In United States v.
Jayyousi, the Eleventh Circuit again vacated a sub-Guideline sentence
because the district court failed to give appropriate weight to the
defendant’s criminal history and his risk of recidivism, compared the
defendant to defendants in dissimilar terrorism cases, and based the
sentence on otherwise inappropriate factors.281 By individually reweighing
and reevaluating the § 3553(a) factors anew in light of the district court’s
factual findings to establish a benchmark from which to determine whether
the sentence was reasonable, the Eleventh Circuit has consistently provided
a model of true reasonableness review. Courts of appeals should emulate
this method of reasonableness review in order to provide a legitimate
check to otherwise unfettered district courts’ discretion.

275. R. Barry Ruback & Jonathan Wroblewski, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Psychological and Policy Reasons for Simplification, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 739, 740–41
(2001).
276. See id.
277. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 720 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1040–42 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (stating
that through Kimbrough, the Supreme Court has authorized district courts to disregard Guideline
policies).
278. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1225 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
279. Id.
280. Harrison, supra note 249, at 1139 (arguing that different panels within the Eleventh
Circuit take more or less rigorous approaches to evaluating “reasonableness” of district courts’
sentences).
281. United States v. Jayyousi, No. 08-10494, 2011 WL 4346322, at *21 (11th Cir. Sept. 19,
2011).
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CONCLUSION
Many district court judges improperly balance the § 3553(a) factors by
replacing the importance of retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation for
child pornography offenses with their personal proclivities regarding the
importance of defendants’ backgrounds and characteristics, including
inaccurately analyzed findings of pedophilia. To remedy these persistent
wrongs, this Note urges courts of appeals to follow the Eleventh Circuit’s
“reasonableness” review that independently reweighs and reevaluates the
§ 3553(a) factors to establish a calculus by which to compare the district
courts’ sentences. This calculus provides courts of appeals with an
orientation from which they can independently evaluate the reasonableness
of district courts’ sentences. Without impartial appellate review, deference
absconds into acquiescence, and the entire criminal justice system falls
captive once again to the moralization of individual judges.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss6/6

34

